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ABSTRACT 
 
Author: Alishan Alibhai  
Title: A Lion to Frighten Wolves: Applying Machiavelli’s Rhetoric to President Lincoln’s 
Policies 
Supervising Professor: Dr. Patricia Roberts-Miller 
 
Since its initial publication in 1532, Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince has earned both 
the admiration and scorn of political thinkers and layperson alike for suggesting a pragmatic 
method of governance that weighs political expediency over morality. These criticisms have 
been overwhelmingly targeted at Machiavelli’s controversial rhetoric, which instructs princes to 
“not deviate from what is good, but learn how to be evil.” Nearly three centuries later, President 
Abraham Lincoln would accept the Presidency, etching his name in the history books as perhaps 
one of the most admirable American Presidents in memory. However, while he is remembered 
for his monumental achievements, like the 13th Amendment or the Homestead Act, his methods 
of deception and sometimes even political abuse, found in his suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus and his true feelings on slavery, illuminate a man who was distinctly Machiavellian. The 
objective of this thesis is to apply Machiavelli’s rhetoric in The Prince to the policies and 
methods of President Lincoln. By using Machiavelli as a framework, this thesis would like to 
inquire how political leaders like Lincoln are able to market deception, and how to reconcile the 
teachings of a man characterized by scholars like Harvey Mansfield to be a “spokesperson for 
the Devil,” with one of the most respected political leaders in American history.  
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Introduction 
 
Deep in the countryside of Sant’Andrea in Percussina, located in the Italian region of 
Tuscany, a weary Niccolò Machiavelli returns to his estate, his clothes covered in mud and dirt 
after a day of farmwork. For the last few years, the Machiavelli family has been confined here as 
a result of Niccolo’s exile from Florence by the Medici. Fortunately, Machiavelli has a plan: a 
job application to be sent to Lorenzo Medici to escape from their rural prison in the form of a 
treatise called The Prince. As he writes in a letter to his friend, Francesco Vettori, dated 
December 10th, 1513: 
When evening comes, I..put on the garments of court and palace. Fitted out 
appropriately, I step inside the venerable courts of the ancients...where I am 
unashamed to converse with them and to question them about the motives for 
their actions, and they, out of their human kindness, answer me. And for four 
hours at a time I feel no boredom, I forget all my troubles, I do not dread poverty, 
and I am not terrified by death.       (Machiavelli 1513) 
 For a few short moments a day, Machiavelli is no longer a prisoner; as his words float 
from the ancients to his pen for a final work of political genius, he prays his Hail Mary will be 
heard. 
 More than 300 years later, a lanky man takes a solemn approach towards a crowd in 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. There he memorialized those who had fallen in a battle that took place 
here four and a half months prior in a meticulously crafted address of national purpose. 
Onlookers admired the powerful rhetoric of their president, Abraham Lincoln, as he recalled the 
dreams of our founding fathers with contagious zeal. This moment marked a watershed in his 
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country’s first and only civil conflict, a moment with outrageous historical importance that 
etched Lincoln’s name into the history books for generations to come. 
 Two men, separated by three centuries and thousands of miles, are distinguished even 
further in our historical memory. Years after the posthumous publication of The Prince, 
historians and laypersons alike have characterized Machiavelli’s guidebook for political leaders 
as an endorsement of tyrannical dictators who reject morality. As the word “Machiavellian” 
became practically synonymous with deception, historian Harvey Mansfield goes as far to call 
Machiavelli the “spokesperson for the Devil.” Meanwhile, Lincoln’s emancipation of the slaves 
and victory in the Civil War makes him a rather obvious choice as one of our most capable 
presidents, well-preserved in our historical consciousness.  
 But perhaps in regard to these to men’s beliefs, memory fails us. Ironically, the 
previously cited Harvey Mansfield was one of the first to suggest that President Lincoln, despite 
all his merits and ethical fortitude, could serve as a model of precisely what Machiavelli 
proposed: a political leader who would use whatever means necessary to maintain the state. This 
was later followed by Brian F. Danoff in his article “Lincoln, Machiavelli, and American 
Political Thought,” where he expanded this line of thought by drawing direct comparisons 
between Lincoln’s political machinations, which played a vital role in the emancipation of the 
slaves, and Machiavelli’s own philosophy. 
 The purpose of this project is to apply the rhetoric of Niccolo Machiavelli, both in The 
Prince and The Discourses on Livy, to President Lincoln’s policies and actions. To be sure, my 
intention is not to suggest that Lincoln is the perfect analogue for Machiavelli’s Prince; these 
men were certainly different in terms of their circumstances and beliefs. But, by continuing the 
research of scholars in the past in an indirect comparison of these two men, I hope to demystify 
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how history remembers them: redeeming Machiavelli as a more nuanced moral figure, and 
humanizing a President who might be more flawed, more “Machiavellian” than we give him 
credit. Additionally on a political level, I hope that this comparison will shed light on the morally 
taxing nature of the institution of the American Presidency, and how even the most ostensibly 
ethical individuals can succumb to the pressures of political leadership. 
To achieve these ends, this project will be split into three chapters, and each will explain 
a Machiavellian philosophy and identifying several ways Lincoln adhered to these at three 
distinct moments of his life. The first section will link Machiavelli’s philosophy of taking over 
new territory to Lincoln’s campaign during the Election of 1860, the second will center around 
Machiavelli’s views on moral flexibility and Lincoln’s questionable ethics during the civil war, 
and the final chapter will cover how Machiavelli advises a leader navigate a republican 
government and Lincoln’s path to passing the 13th Amendment. Under a Machiavellian lens, I 
hope to show how our political leaders, though often placed on a pedestal, are still subject to  
human restraints that naturally incline them towards the same vices as anyone else.  
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Chapter I: Expanding the Prince’s Territory 
“Would I rather be feared or loved? Easy, both. I want people to be afraid of how much 
they love me.” 
- Michael Scott 
Machiavelli and Compliance Gaining Rhetoric 
 While currying the favor of the Medici, whose return to Florence shattered the republican 
political system in place, Machiavelli began The Prince with a discussion on how a leader would 
expand his rule over a new territory. The easiest way to secure control of land that is what 
Machiavelli calls a hereditary principality, or “a principality that is accustomed to the family of 
their prince (Machiavelli 2).” However, his counsel to the prince pertains primarily to new 
principalities. The difficulties surrounding new principalities stem from the fact that when “men 
change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up 
arms against him who rules (4).” During the Presidential Election of 1860, Lincoln was 
confronting a similar situation, so this chapter will apply several methods Machiavelli advised 
for the prince to conquer new territory to Lincoln’s 1860 campaign. 
 Although democratic campaigning is typically war of language and persuasion, 
Machiavelli dealt primarily with action and force. Like the Medici when they resumed control of 
Florence in 1512, their concern was derived from the fear that the people would not be receptive 
to this new regime. Because of their reliance on old systems, populations view new leadership as 
a drastic change in the traditions and way of life they’ve grown used to. While this doesn’t 
necessarily doom the prince, it does present a hurdle in the form of the community that he is 
meant to rule. 
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With this in mind, a prince is required to take certain actions that might make him hated 
by people. Machiavelli’s specific language choices, like “seize,” and “conquer,” imply that in 
territories like these, the prince must use violent and forceful means. But this is where 
Machiavelli begins to draw certain distinctions in regard to what is acceptable. He notes that “the 
wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and 
for this they will be praised not blamed (13).” Thus, he describes the innate human desire to 
acquire territory, particularly for the kind of political leader whom Machiavelli writes for, but, he 
goes on to say, “when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and 
blame (13).” Here is where Machiavelli begins to draw the line: it should be in the prince’s 
interest to expand, but not all means are within the bounds of the prince’s actions. 
So, if not everything is acceptable, then what is? In Machiavelli’s eyes, a prince’s actions 
when seizing new territory can either gain him glory or earn him disdain. This distinction 
becomes especially important in Machiavelli’s explanation for why certain princes stand out in 
history as great leaders. For example, The Prince detailed the mastery with which Alexander the 
Great conquered great swaths of land by not only allowing them to keep their customs and 
traditions due to the variety of cultures under his control, but also by living among them and 
establishing a firm presence among the people. Alexander’s prince was a product of both his 
military genius and his willingness to create a sense of camaraderie with his subjects. 
On the other hand, perhaps one of the most infamous princes referenced in The Prince is 
King Agathocles of Syracuse. Agathocles began from a lowly position in the Sicilian social 
hierarchy, and rose the ranks on account of his military prowess to become the praetor of 
Syracuse. However, his humble beginnings inspired a predisposition towards a cruelty and 
preoccupation with using force to reach his ends, a mindset he reflected in his actions against his 
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own people. While he was praetor, he negotiated an agreement with Hamilcar of Carthage to 
gather the Sicilian people in a public place under the assumption of discussing matters of the 
republic with them. However, he suddenly gave a signal for the soldiers to kill the members of 
the senate and gentry, thus establishing himself as the king. His ascent to the throne, albeit 
successful, was riddled with deceit, malice, and an excessive use of violence.  
One of the phrases, often inaccurately, that characterizes Machiavelli’s philosophy, is that 
“the ends justify the means.” However, in Agathocles case this doesn’t seem to apply. 
Machiavelli concedes that while Agathocles may have become king, “it cannot be called talent to 
slay fellow citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without religion; such methods may 
gain empire, but not glory (39).” In terms of end results, Agathocles did everything a prince 
ought to do: he was fierce, evaded the capriciousness of fortune, and did what was necessary to 
preserve his power. Yet, “his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not 
permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent (38).”  
 This distinction between princes who earn glory and those that don’t, while perhaps 
working a more nuanced side of Machiavelli’s pragmatic approach, continues to appear in his 
subsequent chapter regarding men who gain territory through wickedness. In her article, 
“Revisiting Agathocles,” Victoria Kahn postulated that Machiavelli’s narrative of Agathocles 
poses an issue in that it “[asks] us to consider...the relationship between...success and glory 
(Kahn 557).” She goes on to argue that Machiavelli’s condemnation of the Sicilian king is 
feigned, and seems almost ironic. This appears well supported by Machiavelli’s own admission 
that Agathocles wasn’t unsuccessful in either his seizure of territory or in sustaining his rule. In 
fact, the reason why Agathocles could enjoy a long, prosperous reign was that all of his cruelties 
were committed at the very beginning of his rule and were used only to obtain power. Here is 
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another distinction Machiavelli draws: the difference between “severities being badly or properly 
used.” It’s in this light that Machiavelli advises the prince to commit only the injuries necessary 
to establish rule and security, and to inflict them all in a single blow, while “benefits ought to be 
given little by little, so that the   lavor of them might last longer (Machiavelli 42).” This idea of 
qualified cruelty highlights Machiavelli’s infamous pragmatism for which he is so oft criticized: 
the prince should use methods of deception, cruelty, and violence, but only if it serves a purpose, 
as anything more than that is to indulge in malicious excess.  
 Yet, harkening back to the example of Alexander the Great, Machiavelli does not forget 
the importance of the prince’s subjects. Alexander etched his name so firmly into the history 
books because of his relationship with the people he ruled, and he earns Machiavelli’s 
admiration because he struck such a fine balance between using force when necessary and 
winning the hearts and mind of those he ruled.  Kahn writes in her piece “Revisiting 
Agathocles,” “Machiavelli was interested in making distinctions, not only between successful 
and unsuccessful princes, but between those who achieve glory and those who do not (Kahn 
572).” Where Agathocles went astray was when he abused his relationship with the populace of 
Syracuse; those who take control by slaughter and deception aren’t typically the most favored 
once reach the throne. 
 In Chapter 17 of The Prince, Machiavelli argues that a prince should always strive for 
clemency, to be viewed as just, and to keep his subjects united and loyal. Yet in the midst of this, 
he offers almost contradictory advice, saying famously as he ponders the question: “whether it be 
better to be loved than feared or feared than loved?” Ideally, he answers, it ought to be both, but 
in such a capricious position as a prince, this is often not possible. It’s here where he suggests 
that it is better to be feared than loved, because of the fickle nature of the people, who are often 
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kept better in line through the nature of fear than pure admiration. This frequently quoted phrase 
characterizes the popular perception of the Machiavel, a tyrannical, deceptive character in the 
political realm who values the utility of terror rather than building genuine human connections. 
 But if our earlier analysis of glory and the distinction between princes like Alexander the 
Great and Agathocles is to mean anything, then we know Machiavelli doesn’t subscribe to the 
notion of the prince forsaking the people for purely selfish gains. In his work The Discourses on 
Livy, Machiavelli describes an ideal republican form of government, where a leader is propped 
up by the support of his people, and relinquishes power when necessary. In fact, in The 
Discourses, a republican Machiavelli asserts that “government by the populace is better than 
government by princes (Machiavelli 25),” seemingly backtracking on his established 
philosophies in The Prince. 
 In the Discourses, Machiavelli stresses the mutualistic relationship between the executive 
and his people when he writes, “if princes are superior to populaces in drawing up laws, codes of 
civic life, statutes and new institutions, the populace is so superior in sustaining what has been 
instituted, that it indubitably adds to the glory of those who have instituted them (Machiavelli 
14).” A necessary condition to gaining power, and thus sustaining it, is the prince’s well-
cultivated relationship with the populace. But while extolling the importance of the people for 
the sake of the prince’s regime, Machiavelli never forgets their flaw: how fickle and easy to 
deceive they are.  
 Given the importance of the relationship between the Prince and the people, it’s 
important for the prince to adopt a particular image to woo his subjects. In its own way, this 
implies the Prince must be duplicitous. In his book, Thank You for Arguing, Jay Heinrichs 
explains the rhetorical concept of decorum, where rhetors should let their actions mirror the 
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desires of the people. Decorum is essentially a performance for the sake of the audience, in this 
case one’s subjects, but this performance doesn’t reflect the malicious nature of Agathocles who 
Machiavelli is so critical of. In Agathocles’ case, his deceit was directed against the people in 
horrendous acts of violence, using fear to promote his reign in an antagonistic manner. Here, the 
decorum of the prince’s actions still involves deceit, but uses honey instead of vinegar to attract 
their admiration. 
 The idea of decorum of actions fits under the larger communicative strategy known as 
compliance-gaining rhetoric. In his book Persuasion: Social Influence and Compliance Gaining, 
Robert H. Gass defines it as changing one’s behavior to deliberately induce others to do 
something they would have otherwise not done. Like decorum, compliance gaining is a 
masquerade by its very nature; the speaker is required to adapt and change his behavior to  
manipulation his people. 
 Despite his own condemnation of the people in several instances, Machiavelli still insists 
on the importance of maintaining a proper relationship with them. His remedy when he is taking 
over a new territory is to ease the people into this change simply by lying. Naturally, the 
populace want a prince who is virtuous, meaning he possesses moral qualities that make him a 
suitable leader. But to expect a prince to do this wholeheartedly would be unrealistic and a recipe 
for failure. It’s for this reason that in Chapter 18 of The Prince, Machiavelli instructs that a 
prince should merely appear to possess the qualities of generosity, trustworthiness, and kindness; 
to actually act out all of these virtues will make it impossible for the prince to rule effectively.  
 While Machiavelli’s own political leanings ostensibly stray from ancient philosophical 
themes on ethics and their rigid understandings of truth, his notion of the prince’s manipulation 
of his own image is a familiar tune in the history of rhetoric. Despite the geographic and 
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temporal gulf separating them, both Machiavelli and Lincoln’s educated came from the humanist 
rhetorical tradition, which emphasized evaluating communication based on its consequences.  In 
his book, Saving Persuasion, Brian Garsten chronicles the views of ancient thinkers in regards to 
rhetoric, spending a considerable amount of time defending, or in his words “saving,” the 
practice of persuasion, which much like Machiavelli, has the connotation of being overly-
manipulative and disingenuous. Garsten begins his defense of rhetoric by discussing the thoughts 
of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. Any mention of Aristotle requires the 
acknowledgment of his tutor, Plato, who famously denounced rhetoric as a skill leading towards 
despotism.  
While not fully reaching such a harsh conclusion as Plato, Aristotle actually agrees with 
his former teacher about the negative effects that rhetoric may have. But he only does this to 
criticize the popular way rhetoric was used at the time: in the courts. Greek noblemen and the 
politically ambitious turned to the courts as a way to prove their worth, and often used the  
manipulative tools of rhetoric to twist the minds of the juries. Aristotle thought this a waste for 
what should be a much more valuable tool in a democracy. As a result, Aristotle reframes 
rhetoric as a means of promoting discourse, not necessarily the means for an orator to persuade a 
vast crowd to believe a certain thing. The conventional model of politics and education at the 
time was that of a “sage on the stage,” where a single, charismatic figure would use his 
proficiency in oratory to woo the hearts of the audience. Aristotle eschewed such a model of the 
orator, and instead pushed for rhetoric to be learned as a techné, or skill, only citizens could use 
to discuss the most important issues with each other. In this way, Aristotle saw rhetoric as a way 
to promote democracy, with discourse as its end rather than manipulation. Moreover, Aristotle 
believed that rhetors constantly had to navigate the views of their audience. Crowds in Greece 
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were incredibly partial and opinionated, and rather than trying to change that, Aristotle embraced 
it. He encouraged students of rhetoric to adapt to the wants and desires of their audience to get 
their message across. That’s not terribly different from the adage public speakers constantly hear 
today: know your audience. In this way, Aristotle leveled the rhetor and the audience by making 
one beholden to the other. 
 The humanist rhetorical tradition was shaped significantly by the Roman politician and 
orator Cicero. Cicero was at odds with figures like Crassus and Caesar, who pursued deft action 
at the expense of language. Cicero on the other hand, used his power of words to convince the 
Senate and the Roman populace to take a particular side. He disagreed with the previous 
generation’s sophist tradition, which educated rhetors by teaching them to argue both sides of an 
argument. True discourse, according to Cicero, was possible only if a speaker was able to 
champion his side fully and embrace all parts of it, regardless whether or not it involved artifice 
on his part.  Aristotle and Cicero are fairly important in understanding the motives and actions of 
Machiavelli and Lincoln. Both distinguished private from public viewpoints depending on their 
audience, and whether or not they admitted it, they viewed rhetoric as a skill or techné to win 
over the minds of the people or the electorate. 
 It appears strange on face value that Machiavelli provides such contradictory advice on 
the people. On the one hand, they’re scorned for being an unreliable source of power, on the 
other, praised for being the necessary bedrock on which the prince relies. With his chapters 
regarding virtue, Machiavelli makes clear the idea that the people’s perception of the prince, not 
necessarily the prince’s actions, can be the base of his power, at least initially. As an example, in 
Chapter 18 of The Prince Machiavelli cites Pope Alexander VI, father of Cesare Borgia whom 
Machiavelli extols earlier, often historically criticized for the ethical dramas he brought to the 
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papacy. Yet, his leadership was cemented by embracing the morality of the church to appear 
virtuous, which gained the trust of the people. It’s important to note that Machiavelli’s concern 
with the people is hardly out of a benevolent concern for their well-being; in this case, the 
prince’s constituents, or rather their perception of the prince, are merely a tools to ensure that a 
prince can maintain his power.  
 It might be important to note here that compliance-gaining rhetoric, or decorum, isn’t 
bereft of morality. Machiavelli himself, by drawing the distinction between one that obtains 
glory and one that doesn’t, provides some justification for the strategic uses of the prince’s 
façades to gain favor of others. It is, however, a source of tension for many scholars because it 
challenges our expectations for our own political leaders. In essence, it forces us to consider if 
any leader is genuine in his or her self-presentation, a possibility that most people realize 
potentially, but are willing to turn a blind-eye to until the truth is readily apparent. It seems 
strange then, when Machiavelli suggests that princes need not actually adhere to the virtues they 
purport to have, that critics throughout history have leveled attacks at him for merely 
highlighting the realities of our political system. I believe this is because, as tools ourselves of 
politicians and princes, we are willing and tempted to be fooled by decorum and rulers’ façades. 
In Machiavelli’s own words, “people who want to deceive will always find someone willing to 
be deceived (Machiavelli 84).” Therefore, the use of rhetoric by the prince is a two-way mutual 
transaction: the prince uses the people as the foundation for on which to establish his reign, and 
the people use the prince as someone who fulfills their desire to have a strong, dependable, 
ultimately benevolent leader. Machiavelli’s counsel is nothing out of the ordinary, but has earned 
contempt from many because it points out the reality of every political system, a reality that 
ought to make us feel uncomfortable because of the inherent masquerade that it requires.  
16 
 
 
Lincoln and the Election of 1860 
For many of us, the masquerade Lincoln constructed during the Election of 1860 still 
colors his reputation today. The moniker “Honest Abe” and images of Lincoln as a moral 
paragon who embodied the abolitionist movement still occupy  U.S history textbooks, and 
enshrined him as a practically mythical figure. It’s a narrative that is just as compelling now as it 
was to voters in 1860, but one that requires further scrutiny, particularly under a Machiavellian 
lens, to gain a more accurate picture. More specifically, let’s observe how Lincoln decorum and 
compliance gaining rhetoric to win the hearts of voters in the Republican primary in the Election 
of 1860. 
 To better understand the brilliance of Lincoln’s campaign, it’s important to first set the 
stage he was faced with politically. By 1860, the cracks would that shatter the Union in the Civil 
War had already begun to form. James K. Polk’s presidency extended the reach of America’s 
borders to the Rio Grande, but these annexations had the additional effect of also expanding the 
South’s “peculiar institution” of slavery. On either side of the Mason-Dixon line, the issue of 
slavery— despite modern retellings often ascribing the Civil War to concerns about states’ 
rights— reinforced the American political divide along partisan lines. Southern Democrats, 
rallying behind firebrand demagogues like John C. Calhoun, found a distinct purpose in slavery. 
Their justification for slaves was captured in a very clear image they crafted of the South: a 
common farmer, with none of the benefits of the elitist North, producing the crops that held the 
nation together, needed slaves to work the fields.  
Despite their framing of slavery as a boon to the country, it’s pretty difficult to ignore the 
incredibly racist tone many discussions of race inhabited. In his book “What Shall We Do with 
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the Negro?”: Lincoln, White Racism, and Civil War America, Paul Escott writes, “If we strip 
away popular culture’s gloss on the Civil War and give credence Lincoln’s words, we begin to 
encounter the realities of that era rather than the myths our society created about it (Escot 16).” 
These myths, rooted somewhat in truth, paint a black and white picture along party lines in the 
discourse on race relations: history remembers Democrats as the only racists, while Republicans 
were the abolitionist saviors that viewed black slaves as equal to their white owners. In reality, 
while moral arguments often substantiated the abolitionist movement, racism still ran rampant in 
Republican communities, particularly behind closed doors. In the North, racist codes and 
euphemisms became common ways to maintain racial superiority while engaging in the 
trendiness of abolitionist movements. For instance, “social equality” was often code for 
interracial sexual relations, as was “having someone to dinner.” The real meaning of such 
phrases give a more accurate picture of the mid-19th century politically: the North believed 
slavery was untenable, immoral even, but their view of interracial relationships and African-
Americans in the social hierarchy proves that they still weren’t seen as equal.  
The abolitionist movement itself, while responsible for garnering much of the popular 
support that made Emancipation possible, was more of a social trend than a political movement. 
What was driving abolitionists was a concern with morality. Pamphlets and books with 
philosophical underpinnings challenged deeply entrenched Southern beliefs on slavery, 
circulating primarily in the North among social elites. There was no question among Northern 
Republicans that slavery must be abolished, but the concern for what would happen afterwards 
was a little more nuanced. Internally within the Republican Party, the question of what comes 
after slavery divided the abolitionist cause. On the one hand, some radical abolitionists saw merit 
in fully embracing former slaves as a part of society, perhaps with fewer constitutional rights, but 
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members of the American mosaic all the same. On the other, several abolitionist believed that 
former slaves should be repatriated, sent back to Africa where they ancestors were shipped 
across the sea as part of the slave trade. These divisions proved that no matter the strength of 
abolitionism as a political movement, the populace was still unwilling to give up deeply 
entrenched beliefs of racial superiority.  
As a result, the political climate of 1860 was one of modern abolitionism: slavery ought 
to end eventually, but not at the expense of already existing social structures. This was not 
exactly an easy playbook to read; many radical Republican politicians ran the risk of alienating 
voters on both sides of the aisle for their stringent and unyielding views on slavery. What 
constituents required was someone who accommodated the often disparate moral viewpoints 
among abolitionists who sought to preserve some version of the social status quo, a President 
who captured the full range and complexity of these ideas.  
Concurrently, the 1850’s saw a critical resurgence of the anti-intellectualism. This 
movement technically had its roots in the populism of the early 1800s, beginning with 
demagogues like Andrew Jackson and continuing with similar figures like Zachary Taylor. As 
the American frontier expanded and more citizens began to fill rural areas, the notion of bookish 
elites in Washington conjured nationwide stigma that saw its impact in elections. As Reverend 
Bayard R. Hall wrote in his 1843 book The New Purchase or Seven and a Half Years in the Far 
West, “We always preferred an ignorant bad man to a talented one, and, hence, attempts were 
usually made to ruin the moral character of a smart candidate; since, unhappily, smartness and 
wickedness were supposed to be generally coupled, and [like-wise] incompetence and goodness 
(Hall 281).” The evolution of the frontiersman ideal saw education as a negative facet of 
character: the more well-read you were, the more likely you were to betray the interest of those 
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who may not have had the educational opportunities you did. The stage of the Election of 1860 
was parallel to Machiavelli’s concerns of a populace that was overly reliant on old systems. 
America of 1860 was reluctant to place their trust in individuals that may not represent their 
prejudices. 
In 1859, Lincoln was hardly even on the national radar. While he had gained some 
acclaim for his debates with Stephen A. Douglas in 1858, after his loss for the Illinois Senate 
Seat he ran the risk of being relegated to the dark corners of historical obscurity.  The 
Republican Party itself was in its nascent stages, building on the ashes of the Whig party in the 
early 1850s and often united only by their opposition to the Democrats. What energized them 
was the 1857 Dred Scott decision, a major ingredient in the slavery debate that found its way to 
the Supreme Court, and that also voided the Missouri Compromise of 1820. This decision, in 
addition to restricting constitutional rights of many slaves, began to allow slavery in every US 
territory as opposed to the few delineated by past laws. This put the resource-strapped 
Republicans at a critical juncture: they could either embrace their idealistic desire to end slavery 
altogether, or take the pragmatic approach that would only limit the spread of slavery in new 
territories. 
Ahead of the Republican convention, New York’s William Seward was by and large the 
frontrunner for the Republican nomination. Even before his two terms as governor of New 
York, Seward’s reputation preceded him. Historian and Lincoln biographer Doris Kearns 
Goodwin writes that Seward was “a commanding figure, an outsize personality, a ‘most 
glorious original’ against whom larger men seemed smaller (Goodwin 12).” Not only was he 
physically dominating, but he was also known for giving long, powerful speeches that went on 
for hours, enchanting crowds with his memorable delivery. For all intents and purposes, he was 
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an ideal candidate for President. With an already successful government career, Seward’s 
campaign team headed into the Republican National Convention thinking his nomination was a 
foregone conclusion. 
But as we may recognize now, the nomination was not Seward’s to win. Unfortunately 
for him, the same reputation that made his victory seem inevitable is what led to his eventual 
downfall. In the 1850s he gave a series of speeches condemning the Compromise of 1850, a 
series of four laws designating regions of the newly won Mexican territory between slave and 
free states. Seward saw this as a band-aid solution for an impending civil conflict, and while he 
wasn’t necessarily wrong in retrospect, his audiences were hard-pressed to agree. 
These speeches confirmed Seward’s longtime opposition to slavery. Like many radical 
Republicans of the time, he championed the morality of the abolitionist movement. In one of his 
many tirades against slavery, he mused: “there is a higher law than the Constitution,” 
referencing the ethical and even religious reasons why slavery ought to be considered immoral. 
By modern standards, this seems moral, truly righteous of Seward. But in Machiavellian 
terms, glory was not his to win. While the moral antithesis to Agathocles, Seward bears some 
resemblances to the ancient ruler: he took the extreme, radical approach, that may have worked 
ideologically, but was not the proper course of action because it sacrificed the moderate 
approach that most Americans desired. Seward eventually found his way into Lincoln’s cabinet, 
and his historical memory is by no means tarnished, but he wasn’t the Prince America wanted; 
he wasn’t destined for glory. 
So if not everything was acceptable, then what was? Seward failed because he never 
adjusted to the needs of his audience: he never used decorum to his advantage. To be sure, we 
would be remiss to not admit that Seward was correct. While his predictions about the 
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dissolution of the Union over the issue of slavery, and his notion that slavery was a practice 
bereft of the morality this country was supposedly constructed on, were accurate, Seward’s 
timing was off. The country was simply not ready for a wealthy lawyer and governor from New 
York who waxed poetically about the moral turpitude of slavery. 
What’s strange about this image of Seward is that it’s normally the one history assigns to 
Lincoln, but in the late 1850s this couldn’t be further from the truth. At the time of the 
Republican convention, Lincoln wasn’t unpopular by any means, but was more of a figure on 
the fringes of America’s political consciousness. The reputation of being a “dark horse 
candidate” was a something that Lincoln embraced wholeheartedly. Particularly in comparison 
to Seward, but even to most of those with the loudest political voices at that time, Lincoln was 
one of the least-experienced politicians around. Michael S. Green writes in his book Lincoln 
and the Election of 1860: “he was briefly a militia captain, a four-term state legislator, a one-
term Congressman, a veteran attorney, and a Whig and Republican operative (Green 1),” 
making it clear that he flirted around the edges of the American political system for some time, 
and he never grabbed the limelight to gain the popular appeal of Seward.  
In truth, Lincoln’s reputation mostly came from his time as a lawyer in Springfield, 
Illinois. Lincoln was born in Hodgenville, Kentucky to a poor farming family. His early days 
were spent working the fields of neighboring farms for a few cents that went to his father, 
whom he often remembered as an abusive and distant part of his life. This poor and challenging 
upbringing was nonetheless a launchpad for Lincoln’s ambition; as a bright and bookish child, 
Lincoln embarked on a self-taught educational journey since a formal education wasn’t an 
option. Soon, Lincoln became one of the most successful autodidacts in American history. In 
his early 20’s, Lincoln bought a part of a general store in New Salem, Illinois to financially 
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support himself, and a few years later decided to study law, and teaching himself the law with 
books like Blackstone’s Commentary on the Laws of England, he fashioned himself into a rather 
successful attorney.  
By the time Lincoln began his political career, his speeches earned him mild popularity 
Illinois. For 8 years he served as an Illinois state representative, and eventually began his 
national political career in the US House of Representatives. In her Lincoln biography Team of 
Rivals, Doris Kearns Goodwin recalls a humorous anecdote of Lincoln’s early days in the 
House: when asked his education level on a form, wrote in “embarrassing.” Small instances like 
these began to cement Lincoln’s reputation as a down-to-earth representative of the people, an 
image he would soon use to his advantage in his run for the Presidency.  
 Prior to 1859, Lincoln seemed to share many of Seward’s radical views on slavery. On 
October 16, 1854, Lincoln delivered a speech in Peoria, Illinois giving his objections to the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, in which he made a strong moral attack on slavery. He continued these 
attacks in the famed Lincoln-Douglas Debates, where he struck down the ethical justification 
the South used for slavery. Though the Lincoln-Douglas debates were responsible for 
catapulting Lincoln to the national stage, they were not enough to earn Lincoln the Illinois 
Senate seat over Stephen A. Douglas. This loss, harsh though it was, served as a lesson to 
Lincoln on the problem of radical approaches to slavery, and taught him about the types of 
messages that work on large public audiences in one of the most polarizing issues of the time. 
 In 1859, Lincoln began to adjust his public approach to the issue of slavery. As Seward 
continued to rally radical Republicans around the moral argument, Lincoln opted for a more 
pragmatic approach. While campaigning in Springfield and surrounding areas, Lincoln began  
supporting moderate Republicans with a number of policy measures regarding slavery that won 
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opposition from radical sects. In particular, he adopted the position that slaves would not be 
allowed in any of the new territories, but assured Southern states that their “peculiar institution” 
would still be protected by the federal government.  His speeches began to take a Jacksonian 
approach, where he would indicate that while slavery was a despicable practice, it was up to 
local and state governments to ultimately decide whether or not it should be kept in the states 
where it was already established. 
 This change in ideology was political strategy at its best. Machiavelli warned of the 
inherent difficulty in taking over a new territory because of deeply entrenched beliefs and 
practices of the populace, and that the clear remedy was to adjust oneself, as Alexander the 
Great had done, to accommodate them. Despite Lincoln’s personal opinions on slavery, he 
understood his audience better than Seward ever did. This was even more apparent in Lincoln’s 
rhetoric throughout the campaign. Lincoln was well-known for his use of wit and sarcasm to 
rouse audiences, not only adding a personal touch to his speeches, but also allowing him to 
make references to serious issues in a lighthearted way. In one speech, Lincoln remarked that 
“he could get a man to vote without having him to dinner,” drawing upon the coded racism of 
the time to reference interracial relationships. He was able to play off the complicated race-
relations of the time by calculating the type of message his audience wanted to hear.  
 Lincoln’s use of decorum, that is his adaptation to the image his audiences wanted to see, 
is, of course, inherently deceptive. It successfully reconciled the racist attitudes of the North 
with their concerns about slavery without endorsing the extremes of either side. In a modern 
context, Lincoln’s words and actions might be troubling because some of them fit our 
contemporary definitions of racism. Even more concerning for some might be that our 
understanding of Lincoln was based his reputation as the Great Emancipator, a title he 
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eventually earns with the passage of the 13th Amendment, but he failed to take such a stance on 
the issue until well into the Civil War. 
 Aside from providing a calculated balance on the issue of slavery, Lincoln also 
capitalized on his upbringing to appeal to his voters’ eagerness for a humble candidate. At face 
value, Seward and Lincoln had very similar careers: both were independently wealthy lawyers 
who relied heavily on personal connections and donations to finance their campaigns. However, 
their perception in the eyes of the voters could not have been more different. Seward was 
widely seen as a member of the New York elite, locked in an ivory tower where he could tout 
the ethics behind abolitionism, but failing to understand the worries and prejudices of the 
common man. The expansion of the American frontier did more than provide more land, it 
diversified the socioeconomic composition of major American voting blocks. 
 While Seward was perceived as an elitist, Lincoln did what he could to distance himself 
from such a reputation. Part of this was due to the ingenuity of his campaign staff. During the 
Republican National Convention, votes on nominees triggered a deadlock that required several 
days of voting to get beyond. In this time, as David Herbert Donald writes in his biography 
Lincoln, Leonard Swett and David Davis, two members of Lincoln’s campaign staff, created 
embellished accounts of Lincoln’s Kentucky upbringing to make him seem more like a relatable 
country man than an elite midwestern lawyer. One of the most prominent legends they espoused 
was that while Lincoln was growing up, he would split railroads with an axe. This fable worked  
not only to build Lincoln’s appeal as a frontiersman, but also led to him acquiring the nickname 
“The Rail Candidate,” during the Election of 1860. 
 These were lies that enhanced Lincoln’s appeal to the common man, lies that he wore 
well. Lincoln adopted a new identity and an exaggerated past in an attempt at compliance-
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gaining rhetoric that won him the election. Campaigning is not the conquering of land that 
requires force as it did for Machiavelli’s Prince, but it does require the use of manipulation of 
one’s image to conquer the minds of voters. By adjusting himself to his audience, Lincoln 
appeared to have the virtues of humility, moderation, and trustworthiness, regardless of how 
well these virtues suit his actual nature. And if his historical memory is any indication, he 
successfully earned the glory of princes Machiavelli recalls so fondly. 
 Lincoln’s campaigning fits well inside Machiavelli’s framework, but the kind of 
manipulation he used was not all that unique when it comes to presidents of any time period. 
The art of campaigning and winning the hearts of voters is a matter of using decorum, which 
requires exploiting the most appealing parts of one’s nature and history that the general 
populace is most likely to admire. Why is it, then, when Machiavelli describes the methods by 
which someone wins the hearts of his people, or whether it is better to be loved than feared, he 
earns the condemnation of some? In many ways, what Machiavelli writes and describes differs 
very little from political machinations that are common in modern political campaigns. This is 
not to defend deception in political campaigns, but is meant to cause us to delve deeper into the 
nature of campaigning, and the art of politics, whether one is a prince or a president. 
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Chapter II: Moral Flexibility in Wartime 
“No, if destruction be our lot we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a 
nation of free men we will live forever or die by suicide.” 
- Abraham Lincoln 
Machiavelli and the Vir Virtutis 
 Throughout The Prince, Machiavelli spends a considerable amount of time building up 
the qualities of a prince that separate him from lesser leaders and even “ordinary” people. For all 
their merit, however, they don’t guarantee with absolute certainty a prince’s success. In Chapter 
25 of The Prince, Machiavelli introduces the figure of fortune, a female force of nature likened 
to “raging rivers, which when in flood overflow the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, 
bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, 
without being able in any way to withstand it (Machiavelli 120).” While the concept of “fortune” 
is mentioned throughout the work, this is the first time it’s personified as the mythic “Fortuna,” a 
character whose capriciousness and fickle nature make it nearly impossible to withstand her.  
Machiavelli acknowledges how men before him tended to credit fortune with controlling the vast 
majority of mankind’s fate, and to some extent he was hard-pressed to disagree with them. 
Nonetheless, he argues that although a prince’s own merit still plays a large part in his success, 
“Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions (120).”  
 While Machiavelli’s perception of fortune is not too far removed from our own notion of 
luck, it’s interesting that he goes as far as to quantify its impact by arguing that one-half of our 
fates are tied to fortune. This means, conversely, that the other half is dictated by our own 
actions. Yet this duality still presents another hurdle for the prince, a hurdle that by its very 
description in The Prince seems almost supernatural in its impact on us. In the previously cited 
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passage, the idea that fortune is a “raging river” destroying everything in its path evokes a sense 
of force and violence that one would be nearly powerless to defeat. In this sense, it’s a much 
more complex notion than being defined as all the circumstances having an impact on our lives: 
fortune, luck, circumstances, or nature transcend human command on a level we cannot 
comprehend, so much so that it took Machiavelli several metaphors in Chapter 25 to convey 
what it means. 
 Still, there must be something within the prince’s control, some method or means by 
which fortune will not have unbridled control over the prince who seeks to maintain his state. It’s 
with this in mind that Lincoln envisioned the prince as a vir virtutis, or a man of virtù 
Machiavelli’s understanding and use of the word virtù is far different from how we might use 
“virtue,” colloquially. While “virtue” might refer to a person’s good character or behavior in a 
moral sense, virtù is the drive and flexibility the prince has to counter the capricious nature of 
fortune. The quality of virtù refers to how well one can adjust his tactics to maintain his regime. 
The importance of virtù for Machiavelli in regards to the Prince’s success cannot be understated 
either, an idea apparent in his imagery as well. Machiavelli encourages the Prince to bend and 
twist the river of Fortune to his own will, following its stream, but when necessary he will “beat 
and ill-use (122)” fortune. 
 The primary challenge with our understanding of virtù is Machiavelli’s own ambiguity 
about the term. For our own purposes, and particularly for our analysis of Lincoln, it’s necessary 
to condense our understanding of virtù and say that it defines the Prince as having a dynamic 
quality. We can expand this understanding by viewing virtù as a kind of moral flexibility. In 
terms of language, Machiavelli takes liberties with the characterization of fortune to make it 
more of a female mythical figure, this can misrepresent what he truly means: there are often 
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circumstances and phenomena that, no matter what actions or policies the Prince adopts, can 
redirect his fate because they are out of his control. An unfortunate death, a failed deal, a 
miscommunication, practically anything that is directly out of the prince’s control is what 
constitutes fortune. Adapting to these circumstances with resilience is the quality that separates 
great princes from those who fail.  
 As with any of Machiavelli’s philosophical musings, this naturally presents a question of 
morality. As discussed earlier, it would be a bit unrealistic to expect the Prince to adhere to strict 
standards of morality— our typical definition of virtue— while also balancing the myriad 
problems fortune causes for the state. In Machiavelli scholar Quentin Skinner’s Foundations of 
Modern Political Thought, he argues that the vir virtutis marks a significant turn in Machiavelli’s 
public perception in the years following his death, particularly because it’s the birth of his 
reasoning that morality in positions of power is encouraged, just not absolutely necessary.  
 While Chapter 25 is the penultimate chapter of the Prince, Machiavelli has been building 
towards the idea of moral flexibility throughout the entire book before introducing the vir 
virtutis. Perhaps one of the more prominent examples appears in Chapter 18, when he famously 
writes, “it is necessary for [the Prince] to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the 
winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if 
he can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it (85).” Here is the crux 
of the Prince’s ethical behavior, a golden rule of sorts. Essentially, the primary path of the prince 
should be to do what is good: be trustworthy, honest, faithful, and so on, but history has not 
rewarded princes that are good at every turn. As he writes here, “the winds and variations of 
fortune (85)” still play a role, and the prince must be prepared. So, he must learn to be evil; he 
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must learn to be someone who isn’t afraid to bend the rules, even if it means compromising the 
morality he has worked so hard to appear to possess. 
 Chapter 18 itself also provides some of The Prince’s more powerful imagery as well. He 
hearkens back to Achilles, an ancient prince in Machiavelli’s words, who were “nursed by the 
centaur Chiron (83),” who was “half-beast and half-man (83).” And he argues that because the 
prince must know how to adopt the beast, he should “choose the fox and lion (84).” The lion, the 
epitome of fierceness and savagery, lacks the craftiness to protect against traps and clever tricks, 
while the fox, ever the quick-witted creature, lacks the strength to “fend off wolves (84).” 
Therefore, by adopting the qualities of both beasts— “a fox to discover the snares and a lion to 
terrify the wolves (84)”— the prince takes on the bestial qualities necessary to conquer fortune. 
 During his rule, the prince will engage in a series of treaties and negotiations as he 
conducts state business. In these agreements, it’s important for the prince to maintain the 
appearance of being reliable and dependable for the sake of building a foundation of trust. 
However, the prince should always strive to be good, “but because [men] are bad, and will not 
keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it (84).” Here, the craftiness of the prince 
plays a crucial role, especially his fox-like ability to notice traps set by his opponents. It’s 
interesting that the justification Machiavelli uses to go back on promises and agreements has to 
do with the evil of other men. This allows him to frame dishonesty and deception as a form of 
self-preservation, and if the prince is able to remain virtuous for most of the time and only breaks 
moral behavior in selective situations, he still has the moral high ground against the wolves he is 
surrounded by. In this case, Machiavelli maintains “he who has known best how to employ the 
fox has succeeded best (85).” 
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 In this chapter, Machiavelli returns to the familiar example of Pope Alexander VI. For all 
his reverence towards the Pope, Machiavelli is quick to point out, “Alexander VI did nothing 
else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise (84).” Again, even with the moral 
weight of the papacy, the throne of virtue for Christians throughout the world, Pope Alexander 
still used deception as his weapon of choice. But in the same breath, Machiavelli argues that “it 
is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and 
dissembler (85).” The artifice involved here, similar to our earlier concept of decorum, makes it 
easy to vilify Machiavelli for recommending intentional duplicity. It seems even more damning 
when Machiavelli states that “he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow 
himself to be deceived (84).” But as is the norm with Machiavelli, the framing of these 
“maxims” is of the utmost importance. In chapters 25 and 18, Machiavelli is masterful at 
introducing enemies: “fortune” and “wolves” respectively. As mentioned before, “fortune” 
means all the external forces that threaten a prince, dangerous because these circumstances are 
often out of his control. For purposes of clarity, we can label as “wolves” the political enemies 
the prince might have; ambitious subordinates, members of opposing political parties, even 
military generals that pose a threat, could all fit under this umbrella. These enemies, “fortune” 
and the “wolves,” are Machiavelli’s rhetorical justification for virtù and thus for moral 
flexibility.  
 Despite this justification, Machiavelli has still sustained scathing criticism for his views 
on moral flexibility. But much of that comes from a miscommunication of the boundaries 
Machiavelli sets on when it is permissible to do evil. For lack of better phrase, the default setting 
for the prince ought to be moral good; he should exhibit the traits of fairness, trustworthiness, 
and ethical appeals that he wants his constituency to believe he has. But, when the situation 
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absolutely demands it, evil is a useful means by which the prince can defend himself, and by 
extension, his rule. These exceptions, though not particularly well-defined by Machiavelli, serve 
as the limitations to keep the prince from straying too far away from good. To retread our 
example of Agathocles, his situation in Sicily did not require him to mindlessly slaughter people 
through deceit, so while he may have shifted the winds of fortune his way, he did not do so with 
the tact or honor that a prince still requires. It’s therefore possible to understand why Machiavelli 
took aberrant views on ethics and morality. 
 In his book Redeeming the Prince, Machiavelli scholar Maurizio Viroli argues that the 
central purpose of Machiavelli’s political treatise is not an attack on morality, but instead an act 
of political redemption. In other words, the book crafts an imaginary leader, a prince, who will 
fulfill Machiavelli’s patriotic desire to return Italy to its former glory. This view is expressed in 
The Prince’s final chapter, “An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians.” In it, 
Machiavelli pleads with the Medici to learn from the ancient and modern leaders that he wrote 
of, taking their lessons to rid Italy of its political anguish. He even optimistically reminds them, 
“the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, 
everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the rest (127).” 
This interpretation of Machiavelli’s own motivation can not only shed light on why he 
endorses moral flexibility, but also presents an alternative narrative that complements 
Machiavelli’s own intentions in general as a political thinker. The very name “Machiavelli” 
conjures the image of a cold, calculating leader, who only has his own self-interest at mind. And 
with many of Machiavelli’s own musings and imagery, this isn’t an entirely far-fetched belief to 
subscribe to. However tempting, and even justified, this construction of Machiavelli is, it’s 
important to remember how he characterizes the goal of the prince: to bring his own land to 
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glory. And it’s with this goal in mind that we can take another glimpse at the reason why moral 
flexibility, political machinations, and even lying can be justified using the teachings of The 
Prince. If what is done is done for the purpose of preserving and elevating the state, the regime, 
and even himself, then deceit can be seen as necessary. In other words, manipulation is not an 
end in and of itself, but an instrument by which the Prince fulfills his own lofty ambitions, 
returning Italy, or any state that he has control over, back to former glory.  
 Much of the language used to describe Machiavelli as from the “teacher of evil,” which is 
how he is remembered in popular culture, revolves around this idea that the “ends justify the 
means.” As established earlier, this was not an explicit idea mentioned in either The Prince or the 
Discourses, but a line of reasoning we often ascribe to Machiavelli because of thoughts he 
articulated throughout his works. And while it might be disingenuous to suggest this was the 
ethic Machiavelli subscribed to, it does capture an important idea echoed again and again in the 
chapters mentioned earlier that a prince must rationalize his actions. He never suggests that acts 
of evil, deception, or manipulation are hallmarks of the prince; this is only encouraged when they 
are necessary, there is always some justification, some higher purpose. Sometimes, it’s to fend 
off the enemies of the state, both internal and external; at other times, it is merely so that the 
prince’s regime is sustained. Regardless, without that justification, acts of evil lack a warrant, 
making it so that the prince walks an incredibly fine line between tyrant and rational leader.  
 The complexity of Machiavelli’s own political leanings can help us adapt our definition 
of virtù as the willingness to be evil, to break promises, and to maintain the flexibility to stray 
from the beaten path, but only when the situation demands it. The refined understanding of virtù 
and the justification behind it can help recontextualize the basis for Machiavelli’s beliefs. For 
many years, scholars have been puzzled by The Prince’s departure from the republican 
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ideologies held in The Discourses. But the very nature of writing The Prince was an act of 
desperation. After he was pardoned for his crimes, Machiavelli was nonetheless confined to life 
in a quiet farmhouse in the Florentine countryside 60 miles from any contact with the city. 
Though life was peaceful and not interrupted by violence, Machiavelli quickly became bored 
with the rural lifestyle and yearned for a return to politics. Here is where Machiavelli’s tragedy 
really becomes apparent. It’s important to remember that while he wrote his instruction manual 
on how to rule a principality, Machiavelli himself never actually occupied such a position, but he 
was always the advisor, someone whom the one in charge could count on. Without that fueling 
him, Machiavelli was left without the motivation to carry on.  
 It’s for this reason that in the second half of 1513, Machiavelli rushed out his seminal 
treatise The Prince. It was less a set of musings on Machiavelli’s own political ambitions and 
than an appeal to Lorenzo de’ Medici, the de facto “prince” of Florence. Machiavelli wrote it as 
a way to prove to the Medici that he was a feasible advisor worthy of hire. It’s in this light that 
Ryan calls the Prince more of a job application than a bona fide treatise of ruling. 
 With these circumstances in mind the act of writing of The Prince became an act of virtù, 
as it is a departure from the republican ethics espoused in The Discourses. At the expense of his 
supposed genuine political thoughts, namely that a republican government is the best form of 
government, Machiavelli adopts an “evil” viewpoint, endorsing and supporting an autocratic 
government in order to appease the political powers in Florence. Regardless of the fact that his 
job application was hardly accepted (The Prince was published posthumously, Discourses found 
its way onto shelves even later,) its writing epitomizes the compromising of one’s own beliefs, of 
one’s own morality, for some higher purpose. Machiavelli’s own words find truth in his actions, 
and can help us understand his motivations as a bona fide vir virtutis. The reason why 
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Machiavelli’s words give us such pause is not that he is endorsing actions that stray very far 
from what is typically acceptable, but because he has the courage to point out the apparent 
incompatibility of values that we take for granted. Isaiah Berlin writes in “The Originality of 
Machiavelli,” “What has been shown by Machiavelli, who is often congratulated for tearing off 
hypocritical masks, brutally revealing the truth, and so on, is not that men profess one thing and 
do another but that when they assume that the two ideals are compatible, or perhaps are even one 
and the same ideal, and do not allow this assumption to be questioned, they are guilty of bad 
faith which their actual behavior exhibits. Machiavelli calls the bluff not just of official 
morality—the hypocrisies of ordinary life—but of one of the foundations of the central Western 
philosophical tradition (Berlin 316).” 
 
Lincoln and the Moral Quandaries of the Civil War 
 From the moment Lincoln was sworn in as President in 1861, fortune was hardly on his 
side. While he maintained support of moderate Republicans during the Election of 1860, which 
allowed him to sweep the North in the general election, Southern Democrats and various other 
political factions saw Lincoln as a harbinger for the end of slavery across the country. In the 
wake of Lincoln’s victory, eight Southern states declared that the federal government was 
infringing on their states’ rights, and their intent to secede from the Union. Clearly this was an 
unprecedented problem for the still inexperienced nation: there is no constitutional provision for 
secession, much less the threshold of federal abuse of power that would encourage a state to do 
so.  
 To Lincoln’s credit, he did what he could to appease the South. In his own inaugural 
address, he made the concession: “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with the 
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institution of slavery in the United States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, 
and I have no inclination to do so.” Still, this overture was not nearly enough to address the 
multifarious concerns of Southern states. Of particular concern to Lincoln was the geopolitical 
nature of the conflict. Virginia had already announced its intention to join Southern States to 
secede. Moreover, Maryland had not officially seceded, but was teetering on the edge of leaving 
the Union under the banner of states’ rights. Goodwin’s book The Team of Rivals notes that this 
would place the nation’s capital firmly within rebel territory.  
 To make matters worse, in the midst of a constitutional and nationwide crisis, Congress 
was currently not in session. This disarmed one branch of the federal government, and while 
Lincoln did his utmost to convene Congress for a special emergency session, his attempts were 
unfruitful. In Sherill Halbert’s article “The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by 
President Lincoln,” she writes, “in all events, Lincoln was the President of the United States with 
secession, rebellion, intrigue, subversion, treason, and even armed conflict on his hand (Hablert 
97).” The crisis of the state of the Union were made even more severe by Lincoln’s utter lack of 
experience. His political expertise is limited chiefly by his work as a state representative and one 
term as a federal Congressman.  
 In April of 1861, Confederate forces fired upon Union soldiers at Fort Sumter in 
Charleston, South Carolina, marking the first shots of the Civil War. For the first time in several 
decades, the country was embroiled in war. Lincoln’s cabinet, a group of highly adversarial men 
with their own agendas, expressed conflicting ways to deal with this unprecedented national 
crisis. Meanwhile, the Lincoln administration was still learning the ropes of how to run a 
country, albeit one now split at the seams.  
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 The stress of the country also began to affect Lincoln personally. Contemporaries 
describe Lincoln as being “melancholy,” which many believe to actually have been clinical 
depression. Additionally, the death of Lincoln’s young son in 1862, compounded by his growing 
distrust of his closest advisors, fashioned a Lincoln weathered by the harshness of the 
circumstances that surrounded him. While there is little written proof, many of Lincoln’s legal 
colleagues suspected that he ingested “blue mercury” pills in order to improve his mood, along 
with heavy alcohol use. For Lincoln, fortuna was certainly a “raging river...sweeping away trees 
and buildings, bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its 
violence, without being able in any way to withstand it (Machiavelli 120).” The very nature of 
the situation, being as unprecedented as it was, presented more than a hurdle for Lincoln: it was 
an uncompromising, unforgiving force with all the capriciousness Machiavelli warned of. 
 Still, there must be something within Lincoln’s control, some method or means by which 
fortune will not have unbridled control over his maintenance of the Union. David Herbert 
Donald’s “Reconsidering Lincoln: Essays on the Civil War Era” went as far as to ponder, “there 
must have been, a great many people believed, some supernatural force, some divine guidance 
behind his rise (Donald 4).” Indeed, Lincoln’s triumph over the South was surely stuff of legend, 
but not entirely outside the realm of possibility. For all the obstacles that fortune presented, 
Lincoln surely had the virtù to overcome her. 
 From the onset of the war, territory was of the utmost importance. The precarious 
positioning of Washington, D.C. made it not only a dangerous asset to the Union, but also a 
strategic target for Southern rebels to focus on. Sandwiched between a seceded Virginia and an 
unstable Maryland, our nation’s capital became the center of territorial struggle. The first major 
battle of the Civil War, which resulted in a Confederate victory, was the Battle of Bull Run, 
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where Union troops were baited by their Confederate counterparts at a creek near D.C. For 
Lincoln, this battle was far too close for comfort. 
 It’s no mystery that Presidents are typically bound by rigid constitutional limits, enforced 
by the legislative or judicial branches. But this was hardly a typical time for the country. With 
everything in disarray, the normal constraints that would hold a President back had little control 
over Lincoln, a fact he recognized all too well. Here, Lincoln had the distinct opportunity to bend 
his own morality, and with the stage set for a constitutional emergency, there was very little to 
stop him from becoming a vir virtutis. 
 Because of its territorial threat, Maryland became the site of Lincoln’s most well-known 
act of moral flexibility. Halbert continues: “On April 19th, the Sixth Massachusetts Militia 
arrived in Washington, after having literally fought their way through Baltimore. On April 20th, 
the railroad communications with the North were severed by Marylanders, and thus Washington 
was practically, if not actually, isolated from the part of the Nation of which it remained the 
Capital (Halbert 98).” Already, Maryland’s state legislature had begun having preliminary 
discussions on the logistics of secession. Without Congress there to help Lincoln dissolve 
Maryland’s state legislature, a different constitutional issue in its own right, he was without any 
ammunition in this battle of mid-war diplomacy. As the threat of an insurrection grew ever more 
likely, Lincoln made his first crucial wartime decision: he suspended the writ of habeas corpus. 
 Habeas Corpus itself is a legal term that exists in many different forms of government, 
but for our purposes, as it pertains to the American justice system, it means that anyone arrested 
by the federal government must be brought in front of a judge with a warrant for their crimes to 
explain why they were incarcerated. It serves as an essential check on an abusive government, 
which without it, would be free to arrest whomever they see as a threat to their regime. Even in 
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Machiavelli’s time, the idea of habeas corpus was still critical to their legal system; Machiavelli 
himself was put under house arrest for suspicions of conspiracy to murder a member of the 
Medici family, and while he didn’t necessarily have a free and fair trial, his warrant was still 
made available. Still, Lincoln’s actions is a fact that is mentioned in history textbooks, but is 
often glossed over quickly as a wartime measure made in a time of desperation. We ought to 
acknowledge it as the gross overreach of power that it truly was. 
 On April 27th, 1861, Lincoln wrote to General Scott of Maryland:  
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at 
any point on or in the vicinity of the military line, which is now, or which shall be used 
between the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington, via Perryville, Annapolis 
City, and Annapolis Junction, you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend 
the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you, personally or through the officer in 
command at the point where the resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ. 
                        (Lincoln) 
In Lincoln’s defense, suspending the writ of habeas corpus wasn’t entirely something he wanted 
to do. Halbert writes, “[Lincoln]  looked upon the bombardment of the cities of Maryland as 
preferable to the suspension of the writ— having instructed General Scott that he might, in case 
of “necessity”, bombard the cities, but only “in the extremest necessity” was he to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus (Halbert 97).” But for Lincoln, it was a necessity all the same. The 1888 
Political Science Quarterly provides a modern account in its article “The Suspension of Habeas 
Corpus During the War of the Rebellion,” “it is generally admitted that when a government is 
attacked by a rebellion it is impossible for it to protect itself from conspirators and assassins if 
every one of them has to be taken before a court of law and proved guilty beyond a reasonable 
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doubt. In such a crisis some arbitrary power must be given. The sovereign, whether king, 
president, or legislature, must be allowed to arrest on suspicion, without giving reasons; and in 
doing this, to preserve the balance between the liberty of the citizen and the safety of the 
government is one of the great problems of political science (455).” 
 The utility of suspending the writ from a political standpoint goes without saying: it 
preserves the authority of the federal government at a time when rebellion and insurgency would 
run rampant. But it had the adverse effect of instituting tyrannical principles while trying to 
maintain democracy in time of war, making the decision almost hypocritical. But Lincoln stands 
immune from our judgment 150 years later, in part because of the justification he supplied. 
 That justification found its place in the eventual legal battle that ensued. Later that year, a 
young Maryland citizen named John Merryman began to voice his dissent about the Union. 
Drawing attention to himself by criticizing the President in large public places, he even “was 
actually engaged in raising an armed group to attack and attempt to destroy the Government 
(Halbert 101).” On May 16th, 1861, Merryman was arrested by the local militia for “various acts 
of treason.” When asked to be placed in front of a judge with the warrant of his crime, he was 
refused. 
 Merryman was certainly not the only person arrested between 1861 and 1865 without a 
writ of habeas corpus, but his case was one of the most prominent. Merryman’s counsel 
continued to appear in front of a judge, and eventually drew the attention of Roger B. Taney, the 
acclaimed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court responsible for the infamous Dred Scott decision. 
Taney took over the case as a circuit court judge, and demanded that Merryman be brought 
before the court. However, General George Cadwaladar, the commanding officer of the fort 
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where Merryman was held, refused Taney’s demand, specifying that Lincoln suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus and was thus at no power to release Merryman.  
 In Machiavellian terms, Taney was certainly a wolf. He had already made an enemy of 
Lincoln and the Republicans when he penned the Dred Scott decision, making his opinion on 
slavery clear. More than that, as a Jacksonian Democrat, Taney was the proud owner and 
inheritor of several slaves, and was a vocal critic of Lincoln’s administration even before he 
administered the oath of office to him. Taney took special interest in Merryman’s case given that 
he was himself a Maryland native, and while he did not switch over to the South upon secession, 
his views on the stability of the Union were opaque. This showdown between Taney and Lincoln 
was the culmination of months of tension between the two men, and promised to be a litmus test 
of executive control during times of war. 
 After Taney’s writ was denied, he penned the now famous opinion Ex Parte Merryman, 
where he established that only Congress, not the President, can suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus during wartime. This opinion was monumental, because it not only established that the 
President’s actions were unconstitutional, but also from a legal standpoint should have reinstated 
the writ of habeas corpus across the Union. For Taney, this ought to have been a brief victory.  
 It was here that Lincoln began to show his teeth. Rather than accept the court ruling as 
precedent and attempt to get Congress to convene in order to suspend the writ, he simply ignored 
it. While slow transportation and communication may have played slightly delayed Lincoln’s 
reaction, Lincoln made it clear on many occasions that he was aware of Taney’s ruling. He wrote 
to in his address to Congress: 
I have been reminded from a high quarter that one who is sworn to ‘take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed’ should not himself be one to violate them. Of course I gave 
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some consideration to the questions of power and propriety before I acted in this matter… 
In my opinion, I violated no law. The provision of the Constitution that ‘The privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety may require it’, is equivalent to a provision-is a provision that 
such  privilege may be suspended when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety does require it. I decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety 
does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.  
                                    (Lincoln) 
The fate of Merryman himself was irrelevant; he was eventually released and occupied no large 
section of any history book thereafter. However, Lincoln’s brazenness against the very structures 
and systems he swore an oath to protect showcases his own willingness to bend fortuna to his 
will when necessary. While suspending the writ of habeas corpus is only a slight criticism today, 
Lincoln paid the price from his contemporaries. Halbert writes, “As for Lincoln, he was accused 
of many things, and called many names, of which despot, tyrant and dictator were some of the 
milder (102).”  
 As noted before, this constitutional violation, and by modern standards violation of civil 
rights, was never something Lincoln genuinely intended. We can speculate that if Congress had 
been in session, Lincoln might have gone through the proper channels to reach this same goal. 
But the context of every situation matters. Fortune dictated that in a time of war, a time of a 
house divided, Lincoln had to take certain steps that he thought would best maintain the Union. 
Essentially, Lincoln already knew how to be a good President, but by suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus, he learned to be evil one. 
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 To use Machiavellian symbolism, Lincoln was very much the lion in this situation. He 
showed strength, fierceness, and savagery against the wolves, or his enemies to the South and 
even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Naturally, he faced criticism, but he knew that by 
showing this virtù, the end of maintaining his country would be possible. Perhaps even without 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus, the North would have won the Civil War, but without that 
foresight, Lincoln took the steps that he thought were necessary against the raging rivers of 
fortune.  
 Wartime also forced Lincoln into more clandestine practices. Without the express 
permission of Congress, and supposedly without the knowledge of his Cabinet members and 
advisors, Jane Singer and John Stewart write in their book Lincoln’s Secret Spy: The Civil War 
Case That Changed the Future of Espionage, Lincoln paid a man named Alvin Lloyd to spy on 
Confederate forces behind enemy lines. Historical details of this transaction evade most written 
records, and evidence is limited to testimony by Lloyd himself, but the money supposedly came 
from a secret spy fund that Lincoln retained without the House or Senate’s explicit consent. 
Spies like Lloyd provided vital information about rebel forces and their affairs, while also 
putting their lives at severe risk. Whether brilliant strategy or an overreach of federal power, 
Lincoln showed his ability to be a fox. He caught Confederate traps and ensnared them within 
his own, using deceit to empower himself. 
 These actions in their sum clearly challenge constitutional mandates of the time. There is 
little question that, in any context, they represent abuse of executive power and skew the checks 
and balances system. But Lincoln, like any good Prince, knows to justify these actions when  
necessary. In regards to habeas corpus, he questioned Congress in his July 4th, 1861 address to 
them (humorously on Independence Day): “Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the 
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Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?” Here he’s essentially asking whether a 
single law or writ is more valuable than the sanctity of the Union, a Union he is willing to bend 
his own beliefs in order to protect. 
 Lincoln’s actions during war trigger complicated questions of what is acceptable during 
times of emergency for a president. His own justification and our analysis of The Prince reduce 
Lincoln’s actions to a simple question: is what he did right? From a constitutional sense, we’ve 
established that the answer is clearly no. But morally and ethically, the answer is a little more 
complex. Two and a half centuries removed from Lincoln’s actions, it might be easier to 
rationalize his duplicity retroactively: he was doing what he needed to, and even though doing 
things like suspending the writ of habeas corpus were problematic, they were helpful in setting a 
precedent for the interaction between branches of government in a time of war. However, we 
might be slightly mystified by the reputation of Lincoln, which should make his actions more 
forgivable. Contextualizing the suspending of the writ of habeas corpus and maintaining a secret 
spy fund without the permission of Congress as the actions of a current president might provide 
another perspective. 
 These presidential scandals may not be acceptable in a modern context, but if we are to 
take Lincoln’s justification at face value, namely that these actions were necessary, then parsing 
their moral weight must be even more nuanced. At what level can we evaluate whether 
something is absolutely necessary? Regarding the writ of habeas corpus, Lincoln’s own 
reluctance showed how at that moment, it may have seemed necessary, which might give us 
some reason to believe he made the right decision. 
 Regardless, any President who engages in morally questionable actions can always pivot 
to acting on behalf of the country. Machiavelli’s pleas to the Medici in the final chapter of The 
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Prince can be interpreted as an entreaty to leaders across time to do what they can to protect their 
land from enemies, foreign and domestic, whether barbarians to the North or rebel armies to the 
South. Lincoln’s actions may not be considered moral by modern standards, but the ethics he 
subscribed to might not be comprehensible to those of us who can’t relate to the sheer 
responsibility of running a country.  
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Chapter Three: The Great Emancipator 
“Words of Emancipation didn’t arrive until the middle of June so they called it 
Juneteenth. So that was it, the night of Juneteenth celebration, his mind went on. The 
celebration of a gaudy illusion.” 
- Ralph Ellison 
Machiavelli and the Composite Audience 
 Scholars and students of government agonize so intently over Machiavelli’s work 
because of the often contradictory counsel he provides. In the same breath as he instructs the 
prince to be good, he advises him to learn to be evil; just as he says to avoid violence in taking 
over a new territory, he often advocates force as a necessary step in other contexts. We’ve 
covered scholars who have held Machiavelli in condemned for his beliefs, and others like 
Victoria Kahn argue in her book Machiavellian Rhetoric, “those who condemn Machiavelli for 
recommending such means... have failed to understand Machiavelli’s rhetoric, “his method in 
speaking”: Machiavelli was “an enemy to tyranny,” even as he analyzed the realities of de facto 
political power (Kahn 1).” 
 Much of our understanding of Machiavelli’s disparate beliefs can come from a side-by-
side reading of The Prince and The Discourses on Livy. While The Prince has been critically 
read as Machiavelli’s last-ditch effort to win the favor of Lorenzo de’ Medici, The Discourses is 
often considered to be the true expression Machiavelli’s beliefs. In contrast, Kahn argues that 
Renaissance thinkers were right in believing Machiavelli to have truly been the deceptive and 
manipulative thinker he’s been made out to be. Despite this, she still agrees that the Discourses 
provide a valuable glimpse into Machiavelli’s political psyche. 
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 As a self-proclaimed lover of history, Machiavelli wrote the Discourses as a political 
treatise using Roman history as a point of departure for his own thoughts on government. 
Embedded in his chronicling of Roman history through the 3rd-century B.C.E is an exhibition of 
comparative politics; Machiavelli believed by understanding how the Roman republic operated, 
his readers might gain insight into the strengths and flaws of their own structures of government. 
The reason why the Discourses presents such tension when held next to The Prince is because 
the former champions the merits of a republican system of government, while we recognize the 
latter as a treatise on monarchical control.  
 While the mechanics between the two are certainly distinct on a comparative politics 
level, the republican government of ancient Rome and the democratic republic of the United 
States bear many of the same structural hallmarks. There is an elected executive with a limited 
term, checked by a legislative house of representatives, and the interest of the state supersedes 
those of any one individual. Rome lacked a written constitution comparable to our own, but 
many of the principal ideas and institutions were locked in place. The most significant similarity 
for our own purposes was the rotating executive, or the consul, who would have to navigate a 
complex system of checks and balances against the Roman Senate, our equivalent of a legislative 
branch, to achieve their political aims. In the Discourses, Machiavelli named the various types of 
government, including kingdoms and principalities, and concluded that a republic, especially one 
based on Rome as a model, would be the best. The reason, he explains, is that a republic are 
“better able to adapt itself to diverse circumstances than a prince owing to the diversity found 
among its citizens (Machiavelli 52).” Essentially, the human condition is better suited to a 
republic that distributes power among many men as opposed to concentrating on one. 
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 Among the benefits of a republican government is the fact that the process itself is slow 
and deliberate. For example, in the Roman Republic, the power of the military was granted to the 
consul, but if he wanted to lead a campaign in Gaul, he would have had to turn to the Senate and 
gain their consent before moving forward. The same goes for the Senate’s setting of a legislative 
budget: they can do so, but not unilaterally without the advice of the consul. The decision-
making process goes beyond simple bureaucracy: its checks and balances time prevents any 
absolutist decision. When the government is stymied by gridlock, it’s easy to be the first to 
critique the slow process involved. But in Machiavelli’s eyes, that’s precisely how it’s designed, 
and it’s a model that works effectively. 
 Moreover, republics provide diversity in leadership, which inherently breeds competition. 
In a principality, citizens are locked in a monolithic decision-making structure: power is granted 
to one individual, who with all his biases, preconceptions, and experiences make choices that 
will affect nearly everyone. This works well for the sake of speed, since the prince can make 
decisions without the consent of others, but it works poorly in terms of making the right 
decision. The republic isn’t perfect at decision-making by any means, but in a republic it is 
possible to replace a leader for incompetence. Machiavelli provides the example of Rome during 
the Second Punic War, when it was devastated by the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca’s in 
across the Italian peninsula. At that time, Rome needed to act cautiously, and for that they 
needed a cautious leader. So, they elected Fabius Maximus, a man “who by his slowness and 
his caution held the enemy at bay (146).” 
 However, as the conflict ensued, Fabius’ cautious nature was no longer what Rome 
required. Now, they needed a leader who would be aggressive and swift. In Fabius’ stead, 
Scipio Africanus, who possessed these qualities, was brought in, and successfully led Rome 
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to victory. Machiavelli comments: “If Fabius had been king of Rome, he might easily have 
lost this war, since he was incapable of altering his methods according as circumstance 
changed. Since, however, he was born in a republic where there were diverse citizens with 
diverse dispositions, it came about that, just as it had a Fabius, who was the best man to keep 
the war going when circumstances required it, so later it had a Scipio at a time suited to its 
victorious consummation (169).” 
 Therefore, for a consul to be effective, granted under the republican nature of the state, he 
needs to sift through the diverse range of opinions that can be found not only among the 
citizenry, but also the legislative body of the Senate. Given that both the consul and Senate hold 
consummate abilities that work best when they’re harmonious, this can often be a difficult task. 
Rhetorically, this conflict is best explained by the idea of the composite audience. Frank Myers 
writes in his article “Political Argumentation and The Composite Audience,” “Political 
leadership typically entails the need to address composite, or heterogeneous, audiences (Myers 
55).” Essentially, the politician has to address a wide range of views, ideas, and identities, all 
together in a single audience. The problem is that accommodating each of these views is 
impossible without making some concessions. The only way for a consul to navigate this is by 
singling out particular members of the composite audience and appealing to them on an 
individual basis. 
 Tracking down the desires and needs of individuals in the audience is akin to promise-
making for the consul, gaining the support of single legislators gradually by guaranteeing them 
something that they want. Politically exchanges like these often suggest that politics involves 
backdoor and under-the-table deals, but in Machiavelli’s eyes they are preferable to the unilateral 
control of a principality. For even in negotiating with composite audiences, the consul still 
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retains some power. Reverting to what Machiavelli explained in The Prince, the political leader 
should know how to be a fox, which involves breaking promises when they are no longer an 
advantage to the prince. Men are fickle, and often fall victim to these types of tricks, because as 
Machiavelli notes, “it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a 
great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that 
he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived (84).” 
If the Senate is a hurdle for the consul to achieve what he needs to, then it’s a hurdle that the 
political leader has every skill required to jump.  
 Despite his obvious preferences for a republican government in The Discourses, 
Machiavelli still shows glimpses there of his autocratic political ideas. Often, the slow and 
deliberate nature of the republic is no longer effective; in other words, there are times when the 
country requires a Scipio, not a Fabius. Therefore in The Discourses, Machiavelli notes that in 
times of absolute emergency, the consuls can appoint a dictator, or a single individual with 
absolute power and control for a period of several months in order to hold the country together. 
During this time, the society ceases to be a republic and becomes a full-fledged dictatorship. This 
seems to run counter to the republicanism of The Discourses. After all, what good is a republic 
that fails to administer checks and balances. But Machiavelli is quick to remind us, it’s all about 
the timing: “One should note that when it is said that an authority given by free votes never hurts 
any republic, one presupposes that a people is never led to give it except in the proper 
circumstances and for the proper times (Machiavelli 49).” 
 While the definition of the “proper circumstances” and “the proper times” can be 
subjective, for our own purposes in understanding Machiavelli’s thinking, we can assume that 
this means times when the republic is at threat of falling apart entirely. In such times, many of 
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the ideas and concepts we drew from The Prince now become applicable. Dictators need to be 
willing to deceive, to work closely with enemies, and to be open to the possibility of breaking 
particular promises in order to achieve his end goal. And, like any good leader, Machiavelli 
instructed the prince to root out the sores in society where he could: “The Romans never allowed 
a trouble spot to remain simply to avoid going to war over it, because they knew that wars don’t 
just go away, they are only postponed to someone else’s advantage (54).” 
 Anyone familiar with Machiavelli knows that his work is centered around political 
machinations, but The Discourses is unique in that it helps us understand those machinations in 
the context of a republican government. And given Machiavelli’s political background, it’s 
almost no surprise that this is the method of government he prefers. Much of his work in the 
Florentine government prior to the return of the Medici in 1512 was as a traveling diplomat 
across the Italian peninsula, and after interacting with multiple different types of government and 
working intimately with the Papacy, Machiavelli developed an admiration for his city’s 
republican type of government. 
 But upon the return of the Medici, Machiavelli’s understanding of politics was turned 
upside down. The Florentine government he had come to love, despite its faults, was gone, 
replaced by a republican system in name only, where the strings were pulled by the unscrupulous 
Medici family. This provides some of the disconnect behind Machiavelli the man and 
Machiavelli the idea: one seems to believe a principality is a defective system of governance 
while the other is characterized as the mouthpiece for principalities. As Victoria Kahn ponders in 
Revisiting Agathocles, “how Machiavellian is Machiavelli (Kahn 557)?” 
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Lincoln and the Passing of the 13th Amendment 
 In 1861, Abraham Lincoln was near the tipping point of his first major act of President: 
passing a constitutional amendment. It had already passed through the House, and gotten exactly 
two-thirds of the votes in the Senate, precisely what was necessary to pass an amendment. The 
final step was to get the 13th Amendment passed in each individual state. But as Daniel Croft 
points out in his book Lincoln and the Politics of Slavery: The Other Thirteenth Amendment and 
the Struggle to Save the Union, most who have studied the Civil War will tell you that the 13th 
Amendment, which ended slavery throughout the Union, wasn’t passed until 1865. The reason 
for the disconnect was that the 13th Amendment Lincoln had been lobbying to pass isn’t the one 
that is in the Constitution now. Instead, it was an amendment proposed by Thomas Corwin of 
Ohio, dubbed the Corwin Amendment, that would institutionalize slavery as an official part of 
the United States Constitution.  
 Until Croft’s book, the Corwin Amendment garnered little in the way of historical 
scholarship. Croft notes that other historians, like David M. Potter and R. Alton Lee, had 
mentioned the amendment’s existence in the past, but typically absolved Lincoln of any 
involvement. This is not to say that the Amendment itself wasn’t popular at the time when it was 
written: it had wide support among members of both the House and the Senate. But the 
Amendment itself is controversial now because it reframes how we think about Emancipation in 
general.  
 When several states threatened to leave the Union after Lincoln’s election in 1860, many 
legislators began to try to craft a solution. The salient issue itself was slavery, and along partisan 
lines the split was clear. The only potential hope was a compromise. Luckily, there were very 
few radical Republicans who were hell-bent on stopping slavery altogether, and the most 
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extreme position a moderate Republican would take would be to stop the spread of slavery into 
new territories. Therefore, slavery was an issue, if not the issue, that most Americans disagreed 
on, but it was something that in 1861 they could still compromise on. 
 This is where John Corwin stepped in. A former Whig turned Republican, Corwin was 
raised under the political umbrella of figures like Henry Clay, who subscribed heavily to the idea 
that compromise was the most important weapon in the politician’s arsenal. As a member of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, Corwin also understood the importance of making a 
splash in a heavy polarized political atmosphere, and as the Republican Party was still incredibly 
new, opportunities were everywhere. Fortunately for him, the election of President Lincoln and 
the triggering of the secession crisis laid the ideal groundwork for the compromise he needed to 
launch himself out of political obscurity. 
Modern accounts over the origins of the Civil War had the tendency to dodge the issue of 
slavery, perhaps to save face over an institution that subjugated thousands. But to Corwin and his 
contemporaries, it was hardly a secret that slavery served as the most cogent barrier between the 
North and the Sound. It’s for this reason he believed that if a constitutional amendment allowing 
slavery would pass, it would be enough to convince the states that had seceded to return to the 
Union, avoiding Civil War.  
After several drafts, he finalized this version of the Amendment:  
“No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the 
power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including 
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.” 
 In a few simple lines, the same document that professes to establish justice and promote 
the general welfare would institutionalize slavery indefinitely. The idea itself wasn’t radical, but 
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Corwin was only a lonely representative from Ohio, and he needed reinforcements. The only 
representatives with political capital across both houses of Congress were powerful Republicans, 
so that’s where he turned first. After gathering enough votes in the House, William H. Seward, 
Lincoln’s former primary opponent, current cabinet secretary, and radical Republican who 
wanted to rid the country of slavery at any cost, introduced the Corwin amendment to the Senate.  
 Men like Seward began to use whatever channels of influence they had at the disposal to 
get the Amendment moving, but all ties went back to a common link: Lincoln. At the time, 
Lincoln served as a rallying point for the North, and was the only one who had the institutional 
authority to support an amendment like to gain with national support for it. So Lincoln did what 
he did best: he started campaigning.  
 The first indirect mention of the Corwin Amendment actually came from Lincoln’s 
inaugural address. Granted, this is at a time when tensions in the country were incredibly high, 
due in part to this man’s election. He had it in his every interest to hold the nation together, no 
matter what the cost. That’s why in his first public address to the country, he noted: “[I have] no 
purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it 
exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” To be sure, 
Lincoln had admitted time and time again in private settings, and even in the Lincoln-Douglas 
debates, his moral objection to slavery. But at the time, Lincoln had more to navigate than his 
own personal feelings, he had to sift through the bureaucracy of the republic he inherited. 
 If the American public were a tough group to win over in 1860, then their representatives 
in the House and the Senate at the time shared their jaded and scrutinizing nature. Already in this 
legislative session, more than 200 resolutions on slavery had been proposed, ranging from full-
on abolition to protect slave owners property rights. Of these resolutions, 57 were proposed as 
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constitutional amendments. However, before the Corwin amendment, very few had the 
possibility of passing, and the reason didn’t always have to do with the slavery debate. 
Representatives, like Corwin and Seward, were constantly calculating the potential political 
benefits of their voting for a particular resolution: every vote had an impact on their 
constituency, how they are viewed in influential circles, and even the potential for bribes and 
positions in future administrations. 
Given the timing of the Corwin Amendment, it bore the seal of two Presidents. As the 
amendment was proposed in 1860, it was signed by outgoing President James Buchanan, who 
wholeheartedly supported any amendment that would keep the Union afloat. Buchanan’s 
approval was altogether unnecessary, as he was the outgoing president and because the president 
doesn’t technically play a role in the official ratification of a constitutional amendment. This 
precedent may not have had a direct effect on Lincoln’s decision to approve the Corwin 
Amendment, but made it difficult from the onset to reject it as Lincoln’s first major decision in 
office.  
It was outside of public addresses that Lincoln’s maneuvering began to bear fruit. Once 
the Amendment’s final draft with all revisions had been completed, Lincoln mailed the governor 
of each state the amendment and urged them to pass it, emphasizing that both himself and 
Buchanan approved of it. Croft explains that some of his earliest successes in the fight for either 
13th Amendment was making tacit agreements with members of the House and the Senate to 
guarantee them cabinet positions, even helping them to secure seats in the next election, if they 
gave their support to the Corwin Amendment. And it was a tactic that worked: they got every 
vote needed for the amendment to pass.  
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 The only shortcoming of the amendment, which stopped it from being turned into law, 
was its timing. Six weeks after it passed the Senate and would begin to make its rounds through 
state legislatures for final approval, Confederate forces fired upon Fort Sumter, marking the 
beginning of the Civil War. The very thing the Corwin Amendment hoped to prevent ended any 
chance it ever had at passing. By the time the war began, priorities began to change also. No 
longer would Republicans have to compromise and work through bureaucratic channels; this was 
a state of emergency, and in a republican emergency anything goes.  
 From there, emancipation as we know it now began to take shape, but it would have to go 
through several iterations before it meant post-war integration between slaves and white 
Americans. At every step of the way, Lincoln held his ear to the ground, constantly evaluating 
what the composite audience desired. A year after the Corwin Amendment, Lincoln worked on 
hypothetical a plan to repatriate slaves following their liberation. Historian Ben Levine writes in 
his book The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery: 
Both the law providing for abolition in the District of Columbia and the Second 
Confiscation Act included provisions for the colonization of those willing to emigrate. 
During 1862, Congress appropriated a total of $600,000 to aid in the transportation 
overseas of African-Americans.     (Levine 198) 
Eventually, a black delegation approached Washington D.C. with complaints in hand. 
Michael J. Douma’s article “The Lincoln Administration’s Negotiations to Colonize African 
Americans in Dutch Suriname” notes that Lincoln was reported to have said in the meeting with 
the delegation that it would be selfish for black slaves not to move overseas, and that integration 
between whites and blacks would not be possible. But because opposition to the proposal was 
too strong, Lincoln dropped it. 
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 Several weeks later, on January 1, 1863, Lincoln introduced the famous Emancipation 
Proclamation, declaring “all persons held as slaves in rebellious states are and henceforward 
shall be free.”  This is how history remembers Lincoln: the Great Emancipator. But Douma 
continues, even after the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln still negotiated behind closed 
doors to repatriate ex-slaves. It was only after private opposition heightened that Lincoln’s 
agenda began to change. In the latter half of 1863, Lincoln began to work closely with legislators 
to create the 13th Amendment as we know it now, with the full intention of integrating former 
slaves into current society. 
 There is no question about the impact that Emancipation, and in particular Lincoln’s 
efforts had on the fabric of American society. We fortunately do not live in an America where 
the Corwin Amendment passed. But history ought to remind us that Lincoln was not “The Great 
Emancipator;” he was, if anything, like his idols Henry Clay and Thomas Jefferson: a great 
compromiser. He understood the republican system well and worked bureaucracy to his 
advantage. But the question that we ought to confront is: as long as we got the 13th Amendment, 
does it matter how we got there? 
 In Machiavelli’s eyes, probably not. Lincoln played the game of checks and balances 
exactly as he should have, and the end result was an amendment that was tailored to his 
audience. But it’s difficult to ignore that especially by modern standards, the path that he took is 
laced with memories of a racist American past. Perhaps Lincoln meant well with these efforts, 
and always intended on freeing the slaves with this version of the 13th Amendment in mind. 
However, despite any noble intentions Lincoln may have had, I would argue that his personal 
values and feelings on the matter did not matter in the long-run. The vein of political leader 
Machiavelli envisioned is one that is divorced from his own beliefs. In other words, the prince 
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the person and the office of the princeship are distinct, and once one enters the latter they are no 
longer individuals of the state: they are the state.  
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Conclusion 
Niccolò Machiavelli died on June 21, 1527, unaware of what his legacy would be. There 
was evidence that the Medici received The Prince, but he never learned whether or not they 
actually read it. As a man simply attempting to escape his dull countryside prison, he had no idea 
the transformative symbol he’d become in the corpus of political science work. Similarly, 
Lincoln’s assassination came as he had just managed to put his country back together, but before 
he could rebuild the divisions that still permeated the fabric of the country. Despite this, their 
legacies are still as puzzling as they are powerful today.  
While the purpose of this project was to analyze Lincoln under a Machiavellian lens, it 
stands to reason that any political leader, from a president to a prince, is still subject to the 
corrosive forces of power that influence them to make decisions outside of our typical standards 
of morality. In other words, all politicians are “Machiavellian” by nature, but there are leaders 
like Lincoln who were better at marketing their deception. And perhaps this isn’t something that 
we should criticize: certain occupations require the individual to separate their own ethical 
beliefs from their work. But even if we are reluctant to criticize this behavior, we should at the 
very least be aware of our leaders’ “Machiavellian” tendencies. 
This is not to suggest that the men that occupy these roles, like Lincoln, or that write 
about them, like Machiavelli, are evil, just that these jobs coerce them to take action that might 
be seen as evil. Regardless, this should serve to recontextualize a man who has been 
immortalized in American history for abolishing an institution he, at one point or another, had no 
intention of ending. Lincoln is deserving of many things, but the moniker “Honest Abe” is 
certainly not one of them, and as hundreds of thousands of tourists flock to Mount Rushmore and 
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the Lincoln Memorial every year, we should keep in mind that maybe Lincoln pulled the greatest 
Machiavellian trick in American history.  
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